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Constitutional Law: MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
Public Service Commission: The Tenth Circuit Rebuffs
the Supreme Court Trend Supporting State Immunity

I. Introduction
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commission,' the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar
suits brought under the 1996 Telecommunications Act (TCA)2 against states, state
commissions, or individual state commissioners. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit
joined a small but growing majority of circuit courts' that have allowed telecommunications corporations to sue state commissions based on allegations that
commission decisions interpreting or enforcing interconnection agreements4 violate
the TCA. If allowed, such suits have the potential to directly impact not only the
telecommunications industry, but also the general public. These suits could tie up
state commission resources, including time and money spent on damage awards and
litigation, and could prevent commissions from efficiently serving the public. At the
same time, the suits could also protect ratepayers because the interconnection
agreements often affect the prices consumers pay for services. This potential
protection is especially significant because one of the primary purposes of the TCA
is to promote competition, thereby reducing prices.

I. 216 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2000).
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
3. See GTE N., Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing a suit under the Er parte
Young doctrine); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding the
validity of the doctrine of implied waiver is questionable but allowing a suit under the Ex parte Young
doctrine); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding a state
waived immunity by regulating under the TCA and allowing a suit under the Er pane Young doctrine).
Since the Tenth Circuit decision, the Fifth Circuit has also joined this majority. AT&T Communications
v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 238 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001). Although the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
beat the Tenth Circuit to the punch in declaring that states waive immunity by regulating under the TCA,
the Tenth Circuit "is the leader ... in being willing to find waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity."
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REv. 7, 26 (2001); see also Utah Sch. for
the Deaf & Blind v. Sutton, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding Utah waived immunity by
removing a case from state to federal court); In re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding Kansas
waived immunity by participating in a federal student loan program); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding the Americans with Disabilities Act is a valid abrogation of state immunity
because it is a valid exercise of Congress's Section Five power); J.B. ex rel Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d
1280 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an argument that, under Idaho v. Couer d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261 (1997),
special state interests precluded a suit under Ex parte Young).
4. Interconnection agreements are entered into by existing telecommunications providers and new
entrants into telecommunications markets. See text accompanying infra note 17.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:175

This note provides two theories in support of its contention that the majority of
circuit courts is incorrect in holding that states have waived immunity by
participating in the regulatory scheme provided by the TCA. First, this note argues
that Congress did not expressly condition participation in the Act's regulatory
scheme on states' waiver of immunity. Second, this note contends that even if
waiver was a clear condition of participation in TCA regulation, any waiver by the
states would be coerced and not voluntary. This is because the states' history of
regulating the telecommunications industry transforms the ability to participate in
the Act's regulatory scheme, which might otherwise be a gift, into a threat of
sanction for failure to waive immunity.
Additionally, this note argues that although the applicability of the exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity recognized in Ex parte Young' (allowing certain
suits against individual state officials, including state commissioners, even where a
state has not waived immunity) is difficult to determine, few courts have properly
analyzed the issue in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. A proper analysis
reveals that Ex parte Young is not applicable.6
Part II of this note provides the background information about the TCA and
Eleventh Amendment immunity that is necessary to properly consider the Tenth
Circuit ruling. Part II also discusses the origins of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the doctrine, and the circuit and district
court decisions on immunity in the context of the TCA.' Part IIn explores the Tenth
Circuit decision and explains why sovereign immunity does in fact bar suits against
states and commissions, but might not preclude actions under Ex parte Young for
prospective relief against commissioners. Part III also examines issues that the
Tenth Circuit failed to address in its decision. Finally, Parts IV and V discuss the

5. 209 U.S. 123, 161 (1908). In Exparte Young, the Court recognized an exception to the "general
rule" that a state could not be sued in court. Id. The Court held that state sovereign immunity would not
bar a suit against a state officer when the plaintiff seeks prospective or declaratory relief from an ongoing
violation of the Constitution or federal law. See id. at 161-68. For further explanation and a description
of this doctrine see infra Part II.A.
6. See MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 939-40 (summarily disposing of the Exparte Young issue); see
also infra Part III.
7. The thrust and scope of the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity is not clear. Cynthia L.
Bauerly, Balancing the Scales: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Eleventh Amendment Immunity,
50 FED. COMM. L.J. 399, 401 (1998) (stating that the "full effect of [Seminole Tribe] has yet to be
seen"); Douglas C. Melcher, State Sovereign Immunity and Judicial Review of Interconnection
Agreements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 8 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 61, 63-64 (2000);
Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. I, 7
(1999) (stating that "the Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence is frequently convoluted,
contradictory, and obscure"). This note will not attempt to examine the merits of the Eleventh
Amendment and sovereign immunity doctrines as adopted and applied by the Court. Numerous articles,
as well as various members of the Court, have examined the historical, constitutional, and common law
basis for the immunity doctrines. See, e.g., Young, supra, at 6 n. 17 (collecting "[tlhe essential literature"
devoted to exploring the merits of the Court's immunity doctrine). This note will, however, attempt to
explain the doctrines and apply existing decisions to determine whether immunity bars suits under the
TCA. This note will also consider the existing case law and discuss the probable disposition of the issue
by the Supreme Court.
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Supreme Court's probable disposition of this issue and potential ramifications of this
predicted disposition.8
II. Background on the TCA and the Immunity Doctrine

A. The History and Purpose of the TCA
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, creating the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and giving it the power to regulate interstate
communications.9 This Act, however, left intrastate regulation to the individual
states.'" In regulating intrastate phone service, states usually granted an exclusive
franchise to a local exchange carrier that owned the local exchange network."
These local networks were comprised of switches, which directed calls to
destinations, and wires, which connected these switches to each other and to telephones."

8. In March 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases that are extremely relevant
to this discussion. In Mathiasv. Worldcom Technologies, Inc., the Court agreed to consider the following
jurisdictional and sovereign immunity issues: (1)whether a state commission's action enforcing an
interconnection agreement that has been approved under § 252 is a "determination under section 252"
for purposes of the federal jurisdiction granted by 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6); (2) whether a state commission
waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by "accept[ing] Congress' invitation to participate in
implementing a federal regulatory scheme that provides that state commission determinations are
reviewable in federal court"; and (3) whether Er parte Young suits are allowed under the TCA. Mathias
v. Worldcom Techs., Inc., 532 U.S. 903 (2001) (order granting certiorari). The Court also granted
certiorari in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001), and United
States v. Public Service Commission, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001), on the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331
provides federal jurisdiction over suits under the TCA (as an alternative to jurisdiction under § 252(e)(6)
regarding determinations). Id. These grants of certiorari would seem to put the Court in a position to
resolve many of the issues discussed in this note. However, oral argument in Mathias revealed problems
that the Justices felt could preclude them from reaching the merits of the immunity issues in that case.
In a December 12, 2001, order, the Court extended its grant of certiorari in Verizon and United States
v. Public Service Commission, to include the issues to which the Court granted certiorari in Mathias.
Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. 679 (Dec. 12, 2001) (order extending grant of
certiorari and request for briefs on additional issues). The Court did not specify the problematic issues
but simply stated, "Oral argument has revealed, however, that we may be unable to reach the merits of
the questions presented in Mathias." Id.; see also Supreme Court Transcript of Oral Argument, Mathias,
No. 00-878, 2001 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 79 (Dec. 5,2001) (including questions and discussion about the
State's ability to appeal the issue of immunity barring jurisdiction where the State won below on the
merits and therefore arguably suffered no harm). The order expanding the Court's review in Verizon and
United States v. Public Service Commission may indicate a desire to reach the issue of immunity in the
context of the TCA. However, because the Court did not specify the nature of the issues that could
preclude it from reaching the merits in Mathias, it is unclear whether the Court will decide the immunity
issues in Verizon and United States v. Public Service Commission.
9. William J. Quirk & Fred A. Walters, A Constitutionaland Statutory History of the Telecommunications Business in South Carolina,51 S.C. L. REV. 290, 310 (2000).
10. Michael L. Gallo, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 417, 419
(2000); Quirk & Walters, supra note 9, at 314.
11. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999); see also Michael Kerf & Damien
Gardin, Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs. Sector-Specific Regulation: An
Assessment of the United States, New Zealand and Australian Experiences, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 919,
936 (1999).
12. See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 371.
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Over time, AT&T began to monopolize local telephone service. In 1982,
however, potential competitors and the Department of Justice sued to divide the
monopoly and obtained a decree ordering AT&T to dismantle.'4 This decree
fostered competition in the long-distance market, but technological 5 advancements
hindered competition in local service and it remained a monopoly.
In 1996, Congress enacted the TCA to "promote competition and reduce
regulation" in the local phone-service market and to provide customers with "lower
prices and higher quality services.""' The TCA requires carriers that offer local
service to negotiate interconnection agreements, which allow the sharing of existing
networks, with new entrants to the local market.' Carriers may privately reach
such an agreement, but if private negotiations fail, either party may petition the state
commission that regulates local phone service to arbitrate open issues."'
Any agreement, whether adopted through private negotiations or compulsory
arbitration, must be submitted to the state commission for approval." The state
commission must then either approve or reject the agreement.' A commission may
reject a privately negotiated agreement if it discriminates against nonparty carriers
or if it is inconsistent with the interests, conveniences, and needs of the public in
that local market." However, a state commission may reject an arbitrated
agreement only if it fails to meet the requirements or pricing standards set forth in
the TCA. 2 If a state commission does not approve or reject an agreement within
the specified time periods, the agreement will be considered approved by the
commission.
If a state commission "fails to act" under the TCA, the FCC will assume the
commission's responsibility and preempt its jurisdiction over the proceeding.' This
preemption provision may, at first blush, seem to afford the FCC broad power to
preempt state regulation; however, the FCC has limited the situations in which it
will preempt a state commission's authority by interpreting "fails to act" narrowly. 5

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
note 11,
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Kerf & Gardin, supra note II, at 936.
STEVE COtL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 76, 362 (1996).
AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 371.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996) (statement of purpose).
See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 371; see also 47 U.S.C. § 25 !(c) (1996); cf. Kerf & Gardin, supra
at 940-41.
47 U.S.C. § 252 (1996).
Id. § 252(e)(1).
Id.
Id. § 252(e)(2).
id.
id. § 252(e)(4).

24. Id. § 252(e)(5); cf. In re Starpower Communications, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,277, '1 5 (2000)
(preempting a state commission's jurisdiction for failure to act).
25. See In re Petition of MCI, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,594, 1 7 (1997) (noting the FCC's decision not to
"take an expansive view" of what constitutes failure to act); 47 C.F.R. § 51.801(b) (2000) (defining
"failure to act" as a failure to respond within a reasonable time to a request for arbitration or a failure
to complete an arbitration within the time limits provided in the statute); cf. In re Am. Communications
Servs., Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. 21,579 (1999) (declining to preempt because the request did not allege a failure
to act regarding a specific proceeding).
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The FCC has determined that a state commission "fails to act" when it does not
respond to a request for mediation or arbitration within a reasonable time, when it
fails to complete arbitration of an interconnection agreement within the time
specified by the TCA, or when it expressly declines to resolve a petition.' The
FCC has only found preemption to be proper in these circumstances."
B. The Origins of Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
The judicial concept of state immunity began as a controversial topic and that
controversy has not lost its fire in recent years." In Chisholm v. Georgia," the
Supreme Court allowed a South Carolina citizen to sue the State of Georgia in
federal court for breach of contract. The Court held that Article III provided it with
jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State"
and that section 13 of the 1789 Judiciary Act provided it with original jurisdiction
over controversies "between a state and citizens of other states."" Approximately
three weeks after the Court's decision in Chisholm, Congress passed the Eleventh
Amendment." It provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."3
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment only restricts jurisdiction over suits against
a state by citizens of a different state; however, the Supreme Court, in Hans v.
33
Louisiana,
expanded this immunity to include suits against states by their own
citizens. In Hans, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not create
immunity, but merely overruled Chisholm, which had erroneously abrogated an
already existing state sovereign immunity.' Additionally, the Court in Hans held
that the Eleventh Amendment "constitutionalized" sovereign immunity - that is,
placed it within the protections of a constitutional doctrine." Although some
members of the Court' and various commentators37 have continued to question

26. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.801(b) (2000).
27. See Starpower Communications, 15 F.C.C.R. at 11,277, 1 7.
28. See supra note 7; infra notes 36-37. Although the concept first appeared in case law in Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), it existed in the minds of at least some individuals long before
Chisholm. This is illustrated by statements made during debates about the ratification of the Constitution

indicating that, under the Constitution, the states would retain their immunity. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81
(Alexander Hamilton); see also Jake C. Blavat, Note, Wisconsin Bell v. Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin: Problems in the TelecommunicationsAct in the New Age of Sovereign Immunity, 2000 Wis.

L. REV. 1149, 1155 (giving background information about the sovereign immunity doctrine).
29. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
30. Id.; see also PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 809 (4th ed. 1998).
3 1. Low & JEFRIES, supra note 30, at 809.
32. U.S. CONST. amend Xi.
33. 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890).
34. See id.; see also Low & JEFRIES, supra note 30, at 813; Young, supra note 7, at 12 (stating that
the Court noted in Seminole Tribe that the doctrine recognized in Hans was "of constitutional stature").
35. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16; see also LOW & JEFRIES, supra note 30, at 813-14.
36. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 117 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1!75

the merits of the decision in Hans, a majority of the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
the constitutional doctrine of immunity espoused therein." Additionally, over the
last five years, the Court has relied on Hans to bar suits against states in their own
courts,39 restrict Congress's ability to abrogate immunity, ' limit the doctrine of
constructive waiver,4' and limit the applicability of the exception for prospective
relief recognized in Ex parte Young.'
The exact nature and scope of state immunity is unclear,"3 but the Court's recent
decisions have recognized a well-established concept that states are immune from
suit in federal and state courts. Despite this general acceptance of state immunity,
the Court has recognized three situations in which immunity does not prevent a suit
from proceeding. First, a state may voluntarily waive its immunity, although it is
not clear whether waiver must be express or can also be constructive.' Second,
Congress can abrogate immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its Fourteenth
Amendment power."' Third, in Ex parte Young, the Court held that immunity does
not bar a suit for prospective or declaratory relief from an ongoing violation of the
Constitution or federal law by a state official.' These exceptions have recently
come under fire in several decisions, and the Supreme Court has limited their
scope.' The Court's recent decisions raise questions about the applicability of the
exceptions in suits brought under a number of statutes, including the TCA. 49
C. Recent Decisions Limiting the Exceptions to Immunity
Many commentators have dubbed Seminole Tribe v. Florida9 as the beginning
of the Court's expansion of the state immunity doctrine." In Seminole Tribe, the
majority's expansion of Hans "compounds and immensely magnifies the century-old mistake of Hans

itself"); cj' Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 790 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discounting the majority's
reliance on Hans).
37. See James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An Explanatory Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1274-80 (1997) ("attempt[ing] to revive the revisionist
enterprise" to "cabin the influence of this spurious principle of sovereign immunity"); Young, supra note
7, at 7-8 (discussing various theories advanced to explain the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment); see
also LOW & JEFRIES, supra note 30, at 814.
38. E.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69-70.

39. Alden, 527 U.S. at 723, 727-30.
40. College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690 (1999);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999).
41. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 690.
42. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
43. See supra note 7 (discussing the ambiguity of the sovereign immunity doctrine).
44. E.g., College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 690.
45. E.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55-56.
46. E.g., College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 690; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636-37 (1999); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-68 (1908).
47. See Bauerly, supra note 7, at 405-11.
48. See id. at 413.
49. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
50. See Bernard Schwartz, Federalism, Administrative Law, and the Rehnquist Court in Action, 32
TULSA L.J. 477, 477 (1997); cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 18 (noting the "dramatic expansion of the
scope of state sovereign immunity" during the Rehnquist Court).
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Court held that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which allowed tribes to
sue states in federal court, was not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.5' The Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' and held that
the only method by which Congress can validly abrogate immunity is through an
exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment powers." Because Congress enacted the
IGRA pursuant to its Article I powers, the Court held that the attempted abrogation
was invalid.'
The Court also denied relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine. The Court
reasoned that by including a specific remedial scheme in the IGRA, Congress
evidenced its intent that Ex parte Young remedies should not be available."
Accordingly, the Court held that the State's immunity precluded suits brought
against it under the IGRA.56 Although Seminole Tribe limits the applicability of
Ex parte Young in some situations, the Court did not specify the level of detail and
intricacy Congress must include in a remedial scheme to evidence its intent to
render Ex parte Young relief unavailable."
In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,5" the Court considered whether a state was
immune from a suit brought by a sovereign Indian tribe."8 The Court held that
because members of the Constitutional Convention did not intend for Indian tribes
to sacrifice their immunity as to the states, the states were also not expected to
relinquish their immunity with respect to the tribes. ' More important for purposes
of immunity and the TCA, the Court reasoned that while Ex parte Young should
apply in most cases, it should not be interpreted to permit an action in federal court
in every instance.6 Automatically applying Ex parte Young to afford relief in
every case, the Court reasoned, would be "to adhere to an empty formalism and
undermine the principle" that Eleventh Amendment immunity operates as a "real
limitation" on a federal court's jurisdiction.62
The Court recognized that in applying Ex parte Young, it must balance the need
to protect state sovereignty with the need to prevent violations of federal law. 3
The Court noted that Ex parte Young has valuable application when no state forum
exists and when the case calls for interpretation of federal law.' However, the

51, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
52. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
53. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
54. Id.
55, Id. at 74-75.
56. Id.
57. William E. Thro, The Education Lawyer's Guide to the Sovereign Immunity Revolution, 146
WEST'S EDUC. L. RPTR. 951, 966-67 (2000); see also Bauerly, supra note 7, at 401. This argument will
be discussed in more detail in Part IV.
58. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
59. Id. at 269.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 270, 277.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 269.
64. Id. at 272-74.
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Court also acknowledged that a state has an important interest in administrating
"proper judicial control of state officials," which might be implicated when a party
attempts to invoke federal law to challenge state administrative proceedings."5
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board,' the Court held that Florida did not waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by participating in a tuition prepayment program. 7 The Court overruled
the constructive waiver doctrine established in Parden v. Terminal Railway,"
stating that it could not "square Parden with cases requiring that a State's express
waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal." ' However, it is unclear whether
some form of the constructive waiver concept survived College Savings Bank. This
ambiguity stems from the Court's acknowledgment that a state could waive its
immunity in exchange for a federal grant or gratuity to which it would not
otherwise be entitled." Thus, the pivotal issue in determining whether a state has
waived immunity seems to be whether it is acting or regulating in an area in which
it is entitled to participate or whether it is acting in an area in which Congress must
allow it to participate. 1
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,' a companion case to College Savings Bank, the Court held the Patent
Remedy Act was not a valid abrogation of state immunity because Congress passed
the Act pursuant to its Article I powers, rather than its Fourteenth Amendment
authority. 3 The Court noted that College Savings Bank "foreclosed" the argument
that Florida constructively waived its immunity. 4 However, this statement by the
Court does not clarify the questions surrounding the viability of constructive waiver

because the subject matter in Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank was
identical. Accordingly, the Court had already decided that, in the factual context of
Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, Florida had not constructively waived
its immunity. Thus, constructive waiver may continue to be a valid exception to
sovereign immunity under other facts. On the other hand, another reading of the
Court's statement is that College Savings Bank abolished the doctrine of constructive

waiver and that any waiver must now be express.

65. Id. at 275-77.
66. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).

67. Id. at691.
68. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).

69. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680-81 (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47
(1944)).
70.
7 i.
funds.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 688.
A state could also waive its immunity in exchange for a more tangible gratuity, such as federal
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 635.
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D. The Circuit and District Court Splits on Immunity and the TCA
The Court's recent decisions have changed the boundaries of the sovereign
immunity doctrine and limited the applicability of the exceptions.75 The lack of
clarity as to the proper application of the doctrine and its exceptions' has led to
splits in district and circuit courts attempting to apply the doctrine to suits brought
under the TCA." To date, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have addressed the effect of state immunity within the specific
context of the TCA.?
All but the Fourth Circuit have allowed suits against
individual commissioners under the Ex parte Young doctrine.' However, the

75. See Bauerly, supra note 7, at 404-405; cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 20-29.
76. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that a previous
Fifth Circuit holding that implied waiver is no longer viable after Seminole Tribe); GTE N., Inc. v.
Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 922 n.6 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating "the waiver doctrine no longer provides a reliable
basis for seeking relief against state commissions"); cf, Oliver B. Rutherford, Don't Waive the White Flag
Just Yet: Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
Breathes Lafe into Eleventh Amendment Waiver, 38 BRANDEIs L.J.
581,589-90 (1997) (noting the Court's
disfavor of constructive waiver prior to Seminole Tribe).
77. Compare Bell Ati.Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 107 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662-64 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (holding that a state had waived immunity and that Ex parte Young would allow a suit against the
individual commissioners), and Bell Atl.-Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 233-34 (D. Del.
2000) (same), and AT&T v. Southwestern Bell, 86 F. Supp. 2d 932, 946-47 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (same),
rev'd, 236 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001), and US W. Communications, Inc. v Meacham, Nos. 2:98CV-490K
and 2:98CV-488K, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22003, at *7-*9 (D. Utah. Aug. 13, 1999) (same), and Mich.
Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 817, 825-26 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (same),
and Ind. Bell Tel Col. v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (same), with BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc v. MClmetro Access, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that a state
did not waive its immunity and that Ex parte Young did not apply to allow suits against commissioners),
rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 00-12809 and 00-12810, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 373 (1lth Cir. Jan. 10,
2002), and Wis. Bell, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714-15 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (same),
aff'd, 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1132 (2001), and AT&T Communications of
the S. Cent. States, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593, 601-603 (M.D. La. 1999)
(same), rev'd, 238 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001), and Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. MFS Intelenet of Md., Inc., No.
599-2061, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477, at *10, *19 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 1999) (same).
78. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits issued opinions after the completion of the bulk of the research
for this note. Accordingly, they are not discussed in depth. However, since the Fourth Circuit is the only
circuit court to hold that Ex parte Young does not apply to allow suits against individual commissioners,
I have attempted to incorporate it to the extent possible. The Fifth Circuit opinion simply followed the
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits and does not add substantially to the discussion. AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 647 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the State waived
immunity by regulating under the TCA and "agree(ing] with the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits that
such a suit ... is a 'straight forward' Ex parte Young case").
79. Compare AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 238 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding Ex parte Young allows suits against individual commissioners under the TCA), and GTE N.,
Inc. v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909 (6th Cir. 2000) (same), and Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202
F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2000), and MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir.
2000) (same), and MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 938 (10th Cir. 2000)
(same), with Bell Ad. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. grantedsub
nom. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 121 S.Ct. 2548 (2001) (holding a state does not waive
its immunity by regulating under the TCA).
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circuit courts have reached different conclusions on the issue of whether states have
constructively waived immunity by arbitrating and approving agreements under the
TCA.' The theory on which courts rely in allowing suits is crucial because Ex
parte Young only applies to allow prospective or declaratory relief," so a plaintiffs
remedies in a suit allowed under the Ex parte Young doctrine are more limited than
the remedies available if a state waives its immunity."2 Also, the importance of
analyzing the applicability of both the Ex parte Young doctrine and the constructive
waiver doctrine is increased by the questions surrounding the viability of the
constructive waiver doctrine." If Ex parte Young does not apply and constructive
waiver is no longer a viable exception to sovereign immunity, relief in federal court
may be completely unavailable under the current version of the TCA. '
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits are the only circuits to date to hold that a state has
not waived its immunity by regulating under the TCA. In so holding, the Sixth
Circuit noted that the doctrine of constructive waiver "no longer provides a reliable
basis for seeking relief against state commissions."85 However, the Sixth Circuit
has, in at least three cases, held that the Ex parte Young doctrine applies to allow
suits seeking prospective or declaratory relief against individual commissioners."
The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, by contrast, have relied on constructive
waiver to allow suits and have held that a state constructively waives its sovereign

80. Compare MCI Telecomm. Corp., 222 F.3d at 345 (holding states have waived immunity), and
MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 938 (same), with Bell At. Md., 240 F.3d at 293, 309 (holding "Congress
did not clearly manifest an intent" to condition state regulation under the TCA on waiver of sovereign
immunity), and GTE N., Inc., 209 F.3d at 909 n.6 (holding "it is virtually certain that a state utility
commission's decision to accept regulatory authority under the [TCA] cannot legitimately be construed
as a valid waiver of sovereign immunity").
81. See Gordon L. Hemrick, Roving Federalism: Waiver Doctrine After College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board, 49 EMORY L.J. 859, 865 n.33 (1998).
82. See id.
83. See supra note 7 (discussing the questions surrounding the constructive waiver doctrine). For
an argument that the "'gratuity' exception" is misapplied in the context of the TCA because states are not
constitutionally prohibited from regulating local telephone service, see Recent Case, Constitutional
Law - State Sovereign Immunity - Seventh Circuit Holds that States Waive Sovereign Immunity by
Arbitrating Interconnection Agreements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 - MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 114 HARV. L. REV. 1819 (2001).
84. Arguably, Congress could change this result by requiring the FCC, instead of state commissions,
to oversee and interpret interconnection agreements. Blavat, supra note 28, at 1180-81. Additionally, this
lack of a federal forum is limited to suits against states. If states are not necessary parties, suits between
telecommunications providers could likely be brought in federal court. See id. at 1174-83 (discussing
possible solutions to the lack of a federal forum, including the possibility that states are not necessary
parties to interconnection-agreement disputes).
85. Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 227 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying only the Ex
parte Young doctrine to allow a suit against the commissioners); see also GTE N., Inc., 209 F.3d at 922
n.6 (holding that Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank undermine earlier circuit decisions that held
that state utility commissions waive immunity by regulating under the TCA); Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 202
F.3d at 867 (expressly noting that it did not base its decision on the Seventh Circuit's MCI Telecommunications Corp. because College Savings Bank limited the constructive waiver doctrine).
86. Telespectrum, Inc., 227 F.3d at 416 (allowing suits under Ex parte Young); GTE N., Inc, 209
F.3d at 922 (same); Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 202 F.3d at 867 (same).
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immunity by participating in the regulatory scheme provided for in the TCA."
These courts have also held that Ex parte Young applies to allow prospective relief
against individual commissioners. "
Although a majority of the federal district courts faced with the issue has applied
the constructive waiver and Ex parte Young doctrines to allow suits against states,
state commissions, and commissioners,' a substantial minority has held otherwise.' The circuit and district courts finding no waiver have noted that the states
regulated intrastate telecommunications for more than a century.' These courts
have also held that because the TCA simply allows states to continue regulation of
an important local industry, participating in the scheme does not constitute a
voluntary waiver in exchange for a gratuity or gift.' In finding that immunity bars
suits under the TCA, these courts have recognized the Supreme Court's recent cases
limiting the constructive waiver and Ex parte Young exceptions."
The courts finding waiver, however, have relied heavily on the notion that
Congress could preempt all state regulation of intrastate telecommunications. Thus,
they argue, any opportunity to regulate local markets should be considered a gift
from Congress, which is exchanged for a state's waiver of its sovereign immunity?

87. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 342 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Alden,
College Savings, and Florida Prepaid to hold states had waived immunity by "accepting the federal
government's invitation to act as regulators of the local telephone market"); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 938-39 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding a state waived its immunity in
exchange for the opportunity to participate in TCA regulation, which was a gift from Congress); supra
note 78.
88. MCI Telecomm Corp., 222 F.3d at 342; MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 939-40.
89. See Bell Ad.-Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 107 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662-64 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding states waived immunity and Exparte Young would allow suit against commissioners); Bell AtI.Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 233-34 (D. Del. 2000) (same); AT&T v. Southwestern Bell,
86 F. Supp. 2d 932, 946-47 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (same); US W. Communications, Inc, v Meacham, Nos.
2:98CV-490K and 2:98CV-488K, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22003, at *7-*9 (D. Utah Aug. 13, 1999)
(same); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 817, 825-26 (W.D. Mich.
1998) (same); Ind. Bell Tel. Co. v. McCarty, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (same).
90. See Bell Ail. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294-98 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
Ex parte Young does not apply to allow suits under the TCA because it would frustrate Congress's intent
to limit review of state commission decisions and questioning whether the commissioners' actions would
be an ongoing violation of federal law); Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MClmetro Access, 97 F. Supp. 2d
1363, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding a state does not waive its immunity and Ex parte Young does not
Cir. Jan.
apply), rev'don other grounds, Nos. 00-12809 and 00-12810, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 373 (1Iith
10, 2002); Wis. Bell, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714-15 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (same);
AT&T Communications of S. Cent. States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593, 60103 (M.D. La. 1999) (same); Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. MFS Intelenet of Md., Inc., No. S99-2061, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16477, at *10, *19 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 1999) (same).
91. Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 227 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2000); GTE N., Inc, 209 F.3d
at 922 n.6; Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 202 F.3d at 867; see also supra note 90 (collecting district court cases
that have decided the issue).
92. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1371-72; AT&T Communications of S. Cent. States,
43 F. Supp. 2d at 602.
93. See supra notes 90-92 (collecting circuit and district court cases).
94. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 342 (7th Cir. 2000); MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2i6 F.3d 929, 938-39 (10th Cir. 2000); see also supra note 89 (collecting
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In applying Ex parte Young to afford relief, these courts have pointed to the
differences between the remedial scheme provided in the IGRA and the scheme
found in the TCA to hold that Seminole Tribe does not preclude the application of
Ex parte Young to suits under the TCA.95
III. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commission, AT&T
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc. (AT&T), MCI Metro Access
Transmission Services, Inc., and MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI collectively)
sought arbitration from the Utah Public Service Commission (UPSC).w The
companies petitioned the UPSC for arbitration of their agreements with US West
Telecommunications, Inc. (US West), pursuant to the TCA.9 7 The UPSC consolidated the arbitration petitions, and issued an order resolving a number of
questions and directing the parties to file revised agreements with the UPSC" The
UPSC later reviewed and approved the revised interconnection agreements."
Following the approval of the agreements, US West filed suit in federal court
against AT&T, MCI, the individual commissioners, and the UPSC. US West
challenged certain provisions of its agreements with AT&T and MCI, raised a
takings claim, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the commission from future enforcement of the agreements."® MCI filed suit against US
West, the individual commissioners, and the UPSC.'" The district court consolidated the cases, and the commissioners and the UPSC filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming immunity under the Eleventh Amendment." The district court denied
the motion, and the Tenth Circuit upheld that denial."i 3
In affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Tenth Circuit held that the
State of Utah waived its immunity by participating in the regulatory scheme
provided by the TCA.' The court also held that Ex pane Young applied to allow
a suit against the individual commissioners." In reaching this conclusion, the
Tenth Circuit recognized three limitations on sovereign immunity: (1) proper
abrogation by Congress, (2) waiver by a state, and (3) the exception recognized in

district court cases).
95. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 222 F.3d at 342; MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 938-39.
96. MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 934.
97. Id; see also 47 U.S.C. § 252(b) (1994) (allowing carriers to petition a state commission for
arbitration where private negotiations fail).
98. MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 934.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The UPSC's motion also challenged the district court's jurisdiction of the takings claim.
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 938-39.
105. Id. at 939-40.
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Ex parte Young."l The court noted that Utah had clearly not expressly waived
immunity by state statute or constitutional provision.'' The court also recognized
that any attempted abrogation under the TCA would be invalid because the Act was
passed pursuant to Congress's Article I powers and not its Fourteenth Amendment
powers.'" Accordingly, the court focused on two issues: first, whether the State
had "impliedly or constructively" waived its immunity and second, whether Exparte
Young would allow relief in the absence of a waiver.'"
The court applied a two-part test to determine whether the State had waived its
immunity."' First, the court considered College Savings Bank to determine
whether Congress had conditioned the receipt of a gift or gratuity, on the State's
consent to suit in federal court."' The court distinguished Parden and College
Savings Bank, relying heavily on Congress's ability to entirely preempt state
regulation of private utilities and holding that the opportunity to regulate local phone
service was a gratuity for which Utah had voluntarily waived its immunity.'"
Second, the court determined whether the waiver was "altogether voluntary," rather
than forced or coerced by Congress." 3 The court noted that Congress may not
"threaten[] a state with a sanction if it refuses to consent" because that would render
any waiver involuntary." 4 The court also recognized that "it may be that the
difference between a gift and a sanction disappears when the gift Congress threatens
to withhold is large enough."".. However, the court did not discuss whether the
importance of continued regulation of intrastate phone markets and the states'
historical regulation of that area rendered any attempt to condition participation on
waiver coercive. Instead, the court merely stated, without explanation, that the
waiver was not coerced because Congress "remove[d] only a slice of regulatory
authority" from the states."6
In holding that Ex pane Young allows a suit against the individual commissioners, the court stated that "it was a straightforward Ex parte Young case."
Accordingly, the court simply adopted the holding and reasoning of the Sixth

106. Id. at 935.
107. Id.at 935-36.
108. Id. at 935 n.3. It is unclear from the opinion whether MCI and US West vigorously argued that
Congress had abrogated state immunity under the TCA; however, the court's analysis of potential
abrogation was limited to this footnote. The court stated that the district court "mention[ed] abrogation
in passing, and on appeal defendants briefly argueld] that Congress could not have constitutionally
abrogated state sovereign immunity through passage of the [TCA]." Id.
109. See id. at 935. The court cited College Savings Bank, noting it had overruled Parden's
constructive waiver doctrine, but claiming it also recognized that a state could still constructively waive
immunity. Id. The court also relied on In re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999), an earlier Tenth
Circuit opinion in which the court stated that constructive waiver survived College Savings Bank. MCI
Telecomm, 216 F.3d at 935-36 (citing Innes).
110. See id. at 936-37.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.at 938-39 n.6.
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Circuit in Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Climax Telephone Co."' In adopting
this reasoning, the court held that US West sought prospective equitable relief
because it asked the district court to enjoin future enforcement of the agreement."'
The court did consider a matter not addressed by the Sixth Circuit when it
recognized the need to examine whether, under Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the requested
relief "implicate[d] special sovereignty interests" and was "the functional equivalent"
of relief that would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment."' However,
the Tenth Circuit held that the requested relief would remedy the commission's
actions that allegedly violated the TCA and that such relief would not "affect any
special sovereignty interests or otherwise cause offense to Utah's sovereign
authority."'' " Additionally, although the court did not specifically address why the
remedial scheme provided by the TCA was not sufficiently complex to preclude Ex
parte Young relief under Seminole Tribe, it cited Alden as reaffirming the viability
of the Ex parte Young doctrine. 2'
IV. Will the Tenth Circuit Opinion Survive Supreme Court Review?
Upon consideration, the Supreme Court will likely hold that states have not
voluntarily waived immunity by participating in the regulatory scheme provided by
the TCA. There are a number of factors supporting this conclusion, including the
questionable viability of constructive waiver, the Court's recent support of state
immunity, and the limitations on the exceptions to immunity.' Additionally, the
essential nature of the states' ability to regulate local telecommunications markets
and the history of state regulation might persuade the Court that the TCA provides
a threat of sanction, rather than a gift or gratuity contingent on waiver.' 3

117. Id. at 939 (adopting the rationale and holding of the Sixth Circuit in Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Climax Tel. Co., 202 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 940 n.8.
120. Id. (addressing claims that Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), prevents the
application of Ex parte Young because it prevents recovery of relief that would otherwise be barred by
the Eleventh Amendment).
121. See id. at 939-40. Although the court in Michigan Bell did not address the possibility that the
remedial scheme included in the TCA was detailed so as to preclude Ex parte Young relief under
Seminole Tribe, the Sixth Circuit did analyze such a claim in a later case. See Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 227 F.3d 414, 420-21 (6th Cir. 2000). In Telespectrum, the court distinguished Seminole
Tribe and held the scheme was not sufficiently intricate or detailed as to fall within the exception to Ex
parte Young. Id. But see Bell At. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294-98 (4th Cir.
2001); BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Serv., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363,
1373 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (stating "there are persuasive arguments that the 1996 Act present a limited
remedial scheme ... and that the Congress therefore did not intend Young to apply against the individual
members of the state commissions"), rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 00-12809 and 00-12810, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 373 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2002).
122. Cf.Bauerly, supra note 7, at 411-13 (concluding that states have not waived immunity under
TCA); Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme Court's "New" Federalism: An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 16 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 517, 521 (discussing the current majority's "pro-state orientation" regarding federalist issues);
Melcher, supra note 7, at 78 (arguing that states have not waived immunity under the TCA).
123. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687
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Although the Court will probably hold that immunity has not been waived by the
states, it could find that Ex parte Young allows a party to seek prospective relief
against individual commissioners. However, this is also a debatable issue. The
Court could instead decide that Seminole Tribe precludes relief because Congress
provided a limited remedial scheme in the TCA.'" Additionally, the Court could
apply Coeur d'Alene to hold that, for policy reasons, Ex parte Young should not
apply to allow suits under the TCA.
A. Is Constructive Waiver a Valid Doctrine in the Wake of College Savings
Bank?
The initial problem with the Tenth Circuit's decision is the court's assumption that
the doctrine of constructive waiver survived College Savings Bank. The court's
holding relies primarily on its interpretation of College Savings Bank as restricting,
but not eliminating, constructive waiver." In construing College Savings Bank as
"overruling the constructive waiver doctrine ...but recognizing that a state may
still constructively or impliedly waive its immunity in certain circumstances,"'"
the court relied on In re Innes,2 7 an earlier Tenth Circuit opinion.
In Innes, Kansas State University attempted to claim immunity from a bankruptcy
proceeding initiated by two former students. These former students sought to have
their student loans discharged on the basis of undue hardship."n On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit noted that although Kansas had waived immunity from suits in state
court, such a statute was insufficient to subject it to actions in federal court.a2 The
court also acknowledged that "several Supreme Court decisions provide that neither
receipt of federal funds, participation in a federal program, nor an agreement to
recognize and abide by federal laws . . . is alone sufficient to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity."130
In spite of this authority, however, the court determined that a state may, by its
conduct, constructively waive immunity. 3 ' The court in Innes drew a distinction
between acceptance of conditioned funds, which can operate as a constructive
waiver, and participation in commercial activity that is otherwise lawful, which

(1999) (recognizing that a gift may be transformed into a sanction or compulsion); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985) (holding that the "mere receipt" of funds does not

constitute a waiver). But see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 381 (1999) (noting that in
passing the TCA, Congress removed a significant area from the states' exclusive control); Young, supra
note 7, at 4 (stating that AT&T Corp. interpreted the TCA as "oust[ing] state regulatory authority over
local telephone service - a core state regulatory function for the past 100 years").
124. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-74 (1996).
125. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 216 F.3d 929, 935-36 (10th Cir. 2000).

126. Id. at 935-36 (citing In re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999)).
127. 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999).

128. Id. at 1277.
129.
a general
court).
130.
131.

Id. at 1279 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985), to hold that
waiver of sovereign immunity may subject a state to suits in state court but not in federal
Id.
Id. at 1280.
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cannot constitute a valid waiver.132 The court characterized Kansas's conduct as
"closely analogous" to the acceptance of conditional funds. 3
Following its discussion of the viability of the constructive waiver doctrine, the
Tenth Circuit found that the State's contract with the U.S. Department of Education
"explicitly provide[d]" that the State would be subject to federal bankruptcy
proceedings. Thus, the court's discussion of constructive waiver in Innes is arguably
dicta.M
In recognizing constructive waiver as a viable doctrine, the Tenth Circuit may
have felt bound by dicta in Innes recognizing the viability of the doctrine. However,
because this recognition was merely dicta, the court should have reconsidered the
validity of constructive waiver in MCI Telecommunications, a case in which waiver
was a pivotal issue. Notably, the Supreme Court would not feel bound by such
precedent and may find, as other courts have found, that the doctrine is no longer
valid after College Savings.
Even assuming constructive waiver continues as a valid method of consent to suit,
the factual distinctions between MCI Telecommunications and Innes should have
precluded the Tenth Circuit from applying Innes to find that Utah constructively
waived its immunity. In Innes, Kansas State University entered into a contract that
explicitly required the university to perform certain functions in any bankruptcy
proceeding that arose." Additionally, unlike the state commission in MCI
Telecommunications, the university was participating in a new program, not
continuing regulation of an area it had regulated extensively for more than one
hundred years."
B. Even if the Constructive Waiver Doctrine Is Valid, Does ItRequire a Finding
of Waiver?
At least two other flaws plague the court's finding of constructive waiver in MCI
Telecommunications. First, it is unclear whether Congress expressly conditioned
participation in the TCA regulatory scheme on waiver of immunity because, at the
time it enacted the TCA, Congress could have reasonably believed that it could
abrogate immunity.'" Second, the Tenth Circuit did not sufficiently address

132. See id.at 1281 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1963)).
133. Id. at 1281-82.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1282-83. The contract in Innes provided,
The institution understands and agrees that it is subject to the program statutes and
implementing regulations for each [program established under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA)] in which it participates, as well as the general provisions
set forth in Part F and Part G of Title IV of the HEA and the Student Assistance General
Provisions regulations set forth in 34 C.F.R. [§] 668. The institution also agrees to comply
with all the relevant program statutes and regulations governing the operations of each
Title IV, HEA program in which it participates.
Id. at 1281 n.3 (alterations in original). The court further noted that the statute required the State to
follow certain procedures if a bankruptcy suit was filed. Id. at 1282.
136. See Bauerly, supra note 7, at 413.
137. See id. (stating "it is illogical to read the [TCA] as a manifestation of Congress's intent to
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whether the ability to regulate the local market pursuant to federal rules and
guidelines truly operates as a gift or as a threatened sanction."
At the time Congress passed the TCA, Supreme Court case law indicated that
abrogation of sovereign immunity could be accomplished pursuant to a valid

exercise of Congress's Article I powers.' 9 The Supreme Court rebuffed this

concept in Seminole Tribe, holding that "[tihe Eleventh Amendment restricts the
judicial power under Article Ill, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."'" However, the
Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe after the passage of the TCA. Therefore, an
assumption that Congress conditioned state participation in the TCA's regulatory
scheme on a waiver of sovereign immunity fails to consider that Congress did not
know such a waiver was necessary when it passed the TCA."' One should not
simply assume that Congress expressly conditioned participation on waiver." One
also should not assume that Congress expressed a clear intent to condition state
regulation on a waiver of sovereign immunity. 4" Congress might have intended
to abrogate immunity, but attempted abrogation does not clearly indicate that
Congress expected states to waive immunity in exchange for the ability to regulate
under the TCA or that Congress intended to preclude a state from regulating if it
refused to waive its immunity.'"
The Tenth Circuit in MCI Telecommunications recognized that the size of a
purported gift might transform it into a threatened sanction." ' However, the court
did not discuss whether the opportunity to regulate local markets pursuant to the
TCA was of such a substantial magnitude as to render it a threatened sanction and
not a gift or gratuity. Some courts have considered this factor and determined that

condition state commission participation on state consent to suit" because Congress had "good reason"
to believe it could abrogate immunity when it passed the TCA). Some courts have also held that the
statute did not manifest a clear intent to abrogate immunity. See Bell Ati.-Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F.
Supp. 2d 218, 230 (D. Del. 2000) (holding Congress did not clearly express an intent to abrogate
immunity because it made participation in TCA regulation wholly voluntary by allowing the FCC to
preempt a commission's jurisdiction). However, similar language in Seminole Tribe providing for suit
in federal court was held sufficient to manifest an intent to abrogate. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 56-57 (1996).
138. The court noted that the line between a gift and sanction could disappear if Congress threatened
to withhold something large enough, but, without much analysis, it held that § 252 removed "only a slice
of regulatory authority from [the] state[s]." MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929,
937, 938 n.9 (10th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the court did not discuss whether the states' history of
regulation and the public's reliance on that regulation might render participation involuntary.
139. See Bauerly, supra note 7, at 413.
140. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73; see also College Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999).
141. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
142. Cf. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
143. Cf College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682-88 (indicating that the clarity of Congress's intent to
condition participation on waiver is critical to determining the voluntariness of waiver, not to determining
whether Congress intended a state to waive immunity).
144. See id. (noting that abrogation and constructive waiver are "the same side of the same coin").
145. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 937 (10th Cir. 2000).
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states do not voluntarily waive immunity by participating in the scheme of the
TCA.'4
The longstanding history of state regulation in this area and the public importance
of that regulation also support the conclusion that the purported gift is a threat of
sanction. For more than one hundred years, states have regulated local telecommunications markets. " In fact, Congress was taking advantage of state expertise
in such regulation when it included the possibility of state regulation in the
TCA.' 4' Because continued state regulation of this area is so important to the
public and because states have regulated local telecommunications markets for so
long, conditioning states' ability to continue regulating on a waiver of sovereign
immunity, even if such a condition were clear, could render the waiver involuntary.' 4'
As previously noted, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a gift could become a
threatened sanction if it were too large.'" However, the court did not consider
whether such a transformation had taken place under the TCA. This lack of
consideration renders the decision incomplete at best and puts its conclusion in
question.
C. Does Ex Parte Young Really Allow Suits Under the TCA?
An additional flaw in the Tenth Circuit decision is the disproportionately brief
analysis afforded to the application of Ex parte Young. The brevity of the court's
reasoning in its application of Ex parte Young is especially disturbing in light of the
questionable viability of the constructive waiver doctrine' on which the remaining

146. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCImetro Access, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2000),

rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 00-12809 and 00-12810, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 373 (1lth Cir. Jan. 10,
2002); AT&T Communications of S. Cent. States, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593,
601-602 (M.D. La. 1999).
147. Young, supra note 7, at 4.
148. See Prepared Testimony of James D. Ellis: Senior Executive Vice President and General
Counsel: SBC Communications Inc.: Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Sept.
II, 1996, LEXIS, FEDNEWS Database, also available at 1996 WL 10830691 (stating that "in
recognition of the fact that regulation of local exchange telephony has historically been .. .under the
control of the state public service commission, Congress gave the states a significant role" in regulation
under the TCA); Prepared Testimony of the Honorable Julia L. Johnson: Commissioner, Florida Public
Service Commission: Chair, Federal Legislation and Regulation Subcommittee of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners - NARUC: Committee on Communications
Commissioner, 254 Universal Service Joint Board Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation on Implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, FED. NEws SERV., June 18,
1996, LEXIS, FEDNEWS Database, also available at 1996 WL 10165037 (noting "Congress's decision
[in the TCA] to leave direct oversight of the states' markets to the states was the most expedient means
of assuring the development of genuine local exchange competition").
149. See Bellsouth Telecomm., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1372; AT&T Communications of S. Cent. States,
43 F. Supp. 2d at 601-602.
150. See MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 937; see also supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the argument that a "gift" can be too large and therefore coercive and collecting cases).
151. See Rutherford, supra note 76, at 589-90 (noting the Court's hostility to the constructive waiver
doctrine prior to Seminole Tribe).
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analysis relies. The primary problem with the court's application of Ex parte Young
is its failure to consider whether the remedial scheme provided by the TCA
forecloses the application of Ex parte Young under Seminole Tribe.' The second
problem is that the court did not sufficiently examine, as required by Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, whether the relief provided by Ex parte Young would otherwise be prohibited
because of immunity and because it "implicates special sovereign interests." ' 3
1.The Ex parte Young Doctrine Does Not Apply to Allow Suits Against Individual State Commissioners Because the TCA Contains a Detailed Remedial
Scheme
The Tenth Circuit did not even attempt to discuss the characteristics of the state
interests involved, but summarily stated that relief against the individual commissioners would not infringe on any sovereign interest." This lack of analysis is even
more troubling because the remedial scheme provided by the TCA is arguably
detailed5 enough that, under Seminole Tribe, it precludes the application of Ex parte
Young.1 5

In Seminole Tribe, the Court refused to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine because
Congress provided specific remedies under the IGRA.w Unfortunately, the Court
did not indicate the level of specificity necessary to preclude the availability of Ex
parte Young relief.' Some courts have held that the TCA's remedial scheme is
intricate and detailed enough to bar the application of Ex parte Young.' 5 However,
most of the circuit courts that have considered the issue have distinguished Seminole
Tribe. These courts have held that Ex parte Young applies to allow suits against
officials under the TCA because the remedial scheme in Seminole Tribe was far more
detailed and functioned as a stricter limitation on the available remedies than the
scheme provided by the TCA."9

152. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (stating that "where Congress has
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement [of a particular federal right], a court should
hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer").
153. MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 940 n.8.
154. Id.
155. See Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MClmctro Access, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373 (N.D. Ga.
2000). rev'd on other grounds, Nos. 00-12809 and 00-12810, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 373(1Ith Cir. Jan.
10. 2002); AT&T Communications of S. Cent. States v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593,
602 (M.D. La. 1999); Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. MFS Intelenet of Md., Inc., No. S99-2061, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16477, at *19 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 1999); Bauerly, supra note 7, at 409-10.
156. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
157. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ability to Sue State Government Narrowed, TRIAL, Dec. 1999, at 72,
73; see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Case Law Development: Access Issues, 24 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DISABILITY
L. Rrm. 194, 199 (2000).
158. See Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; AT&T Communications of S. Cent.
States, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 602; Bell Atl-Md., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477, at *19.
159. AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 238 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
Ex parte Young allows suits against individual commissioners under the TCA); GTE N., Inc. v. Strand,
209 F.3d 909 (6th Cir. 2000); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 111.
Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 2000);
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 938-39 (10th Cir. 2000).
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The IGRA, at issue in Seminole Tribe, imposed a duty on states to negotiate in
good faith with Indian tribes and attempted to provide judicial enforcement of this
good-faith obligation.'o The statute restricted the available remedy to a federal
court order directing the parties to arrive at an agreement within a specified time."'
Additionally, the statute provided that the only possible sanction for violating the
court order was mandatory mediation. 6 If the mediation failed to produce an
agreement, the Secretary of the Interior would create regulations. 63 The Court in
Seminole Tribe held that this limit on the remedies and judicial review available
under the IGRA precluded the availability of remedies under Ex parte Young.' " The
Court reasoned that if Ex parte Young applied, states would be subject to remedies
other than those intended by Congress. 5
Clearly, the scheme in the IGRA is more complex than that in the TCA. However,
"there are persuasive arguments that the [TCA] presents a limited remedial scheme"
by constraining the scope of judicial review and providing specific remedies that do
not include prospective relief."
First, the TCA allows specific methods of
obtaining relief. For instance, Congress provided parties with the ability to petition
a state commission for arbitration and mediation of interconnection agreements.'
Congress further specified timetables by which the commission must adopt
agreements and allowed the FCC to preempt a state commission's jurisdiction only
if the commission failed to act within those time constraints."' Second, the scope
of review available under the TCA may be limited. Some courts have held that
Congress limited federal court review to a commission's approval or rejection of
interconnection agreements." Courts have also held that such review is limited to
questions of compliance with specific sections of the TCA and does not include
questions of compliance with state law. 70 Finally, the act arguably limits remedies
to actions against the state, not the commission, thus evidencing an intent that Ex
parte Young remedies should not be available.
The Supreme Court could certainly decide that the remedial scheme in the TCA
is complex enough to preclude suits under Ex parte Young. Additionally, considering
the Court's recent cases upholding state immunity and thwarting congressional efforts,

160. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
161. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994).
162. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74.

163. Id. at 74-75.
164. Id. at 75.
165. Id.

166. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MClmetro Access, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2000);
see also Bauerly, supra note 7, at 409-10.
167. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b) (1994).

168. Id.
169. Cf Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 208 F.3d 475, 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2000)

(refusing to interpret § 252(e)(6) as limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to decisions approving or
rejecting agreements but recognizing a circuit split).
170. See id.
at 481 (recognizing a circuit split on the issue of whether federal courts are authorized
to review a state commission's compliance with state law).
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to circumvent that immunity without an express waiver, the Court may find the
scheme so complex as to foreclose the availability of Ex parte Young suits.
2. The Relief Requested Against the State Commissioners May Implicate Special
Sovereign Interests
The second flaw in the Tenth Circuit's disposition of the Ex pane Young issue is
its failure to thoroughly examine the state interests implicated by suits under the
TCA. The Tenth Circuit, in J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 7' recognized that Coeur
d'Alene Tribe requires courts to consider whether relief against state officials
"implicates special sovereignty interests" and is the "functional equivalent" of relief
against a state that would otherwise be prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment."
Although the court in MCI Telecommunications recognized this requirement, it
summarily stated that no sovereign interest was violated in awarding relief against
the Utah commissioners.' The court did not consider the characteristics of such
interests but relegated its discussion to a single footnote. 74 Because of the history
of state regulation of this area and the local character of intrastate telecommunications markets, this question should be properly analyzed and examined before
courts apply Ex parte Young to allow suits.'
The Supreme Court in Coeur d'Alene Tribe recognized that where state sovereign
interests are implicated and relief under Ex pane Young is the functional equivalent
to that which the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise prohibit, Ex pane Young
should not be applied to afford relief.76 In suits brought under the TCA, the
telecommunications company generally seeks review of a commission decision to
determine whether it complies with federal law. Similarly, in an Exparte Young suit,
the telecommunications company generally seeks equitable relief to prevent a
commission from enforcing a decision alleged to violate the TCA."7 The relief
sought against individual commissioners is very similar to, and is the functional
equivalent of, that sought against a state. However, because the relief afforded by Ex
parte Young is almost always very similar to the relief sought against a state itself,
the key issue becomes whether the relief impacts "special sovereign interests. '
The property rights involved in Coeur d'Alene Tribe and the regulation of local
telecommunications industry are very different. However, it is not obvious or
apparent that Ex parte Young should apply. As previously indicated, the states have
a long history of regulating intrastate telecommunications markets. However,
Congress could have regulated the entire field, preventing any state regulation, had

171. 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999).
172. Id. at 1286.
173. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 940 n.8 (10th Cir. 2000).
174. See id.
175. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270, 277 (1997) (noting that Ex parte Young
generally applies if a party seeks prospective relief, based on a federal right, against a state official but
stating it should not be interpreted to apply to all such situations).
176. d. at 281-82.
177. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm., 216 F.3d at 939.
178. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:175

it chosen to do so." Additionally, although the Court has previously recognized
that "having the power to make decisions and set policy is what gives the state its
sovereign nature," it has "upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed
state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions."'" Thus, the
Court could decide that because the TCA acts only as a guide and because Congress
could preempt the area entirely, suits for prospective relief would not implicate
sovereign interests so as to preclude Ex parte Young relief. However, to dispose of
this issue without analysis underestimates its importance and the unpredictability of
its resolution.
V. Conclusion
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court will continue its course of protecting
state sovereign immunity. Many commentators and scholars are calling for a halt to
the apparently never-ending growth of the doctrine. The fact that each of the Court's
most recent decisions, Seminole Tribe, Alden, and College Savings Bank, have been
delivered by only a five-Justice majority adds to the uncertainty. This increases the
importance of the composition of the Court and makes the resolution of the issue of
sovereign immunity under the TCA even more unpredictable.
The Court has not set clear boundaries for its current sovereign immunity doctrine.
Therefore, it is difficult to predict the Court's disposition of the issue, even if the
Court were to continue its current trend of upholding state immunity. However, the
Tenth Circuit clearly failed to address a number of issues and arguments in MCI
Telecommunications. The viability of the doctrine of constructive waiver is
questionable after Seminole Tribe, but the court assumed its viability. Even if viable,
the doctrine's application to suits brought pursuant to the TCA is another issue that
the court did not fully explore. Additionally, the court did not sufficiently address the
questions of whether the continued regulation of local telephone markets is truly a
"gift" and whether the statute clearly requires waiver for a state to participate in the
regulatory scheme. Nor were these questions adequately addressed by many of the
other circuits that have decided the issue. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's conclusory
application of Ex parte Young in the face of Coeur d'Alene Tribe and Seminole Tribe
begs the question of whether this exception to immunity can afford relief.
The threat of lawsuits challenging decisions by state commissioners grows as the
number of approved agreements increases. Without state immunity, valuable
commission resources, including time and money, could be diminished by suits
seeking federal review of state commission actions. If the defense of state immunity
is available, it could limit potential plaintiffs to review by state courts, and even that
review could be dependent upon a state's waiver of immunity in its own courts.
Stephanie Chapman

179. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 743, 764 (1982) ("The commerce power permits Congress
to preempt the States entirely in the regulation of private utilities."); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 290-91 (1981).
180. FERC, 456 U.S. at 762.
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